Monday, December 24, 2007

Mere Christianity, Chapter 2

I foolishly just drank a bunch of coffee writing the last post, so I won't be going to sleep anytime soon.

In the second chapter of Mere Christianity, CS Lewis tries to further define the Law of Nature. I thought this was a good summation of his argument in this chapter:

 "If your moral ideas can be truer, and those of the Nazis less true, there must be something - some Real Morality- for them to be true about. The reason why your idea of New York can be truer or less true than mine is that New York is a real place, existing quite apart from what either of us thinks." 

Clearly, the Law of Nature is some sort of standard which we all must measure up against. This reminds me of the Platonic realism, where each chair is but a reproduction of an ideal chair that exists outside of our physical realm. I cannot speak as to whether this is true or not. What I can argue with is the logical conclusion that it typically seems to reach: That there are a number of moral rules which can be inflexibly applied to all situations, without exception. Judgement can be passed based on people or groups based their ability to meet that criteria. This certainly seems to be Lewis' goal.

Here is my complaint: In life, there are conflicts of interest in morals. What do I do when I want to stick up for a friend, but the friend is behaving poorly? When I want to be honest, but am starving and cannot buy food? When I want to have a safe society, but also give a second chance to a criminal  who seems to have reformed? In none of these cases do I see a way to follow the Law of Nature as Lewis has described it: for him, these look like no-win situations where there is no option but to break the law. 

I'd rather look for a conception of the Law of Nature that avoids these contradictions and helps describe human behavior as we actually see it. 

The only way I can see to explain this is that there are multiple values that people have and want to pursue, each equally good as all the others. For example, I value friendship and good conduct, honesty and life, safety and mercy.  In each scenario, I would be very hard pressed to choose between the two options. I may choose one, but could perfectly well understand someone who chose the opposite way. It would be nothing more than a differing of opinion at that point. 

An individual's morality, then, could simply be the ranking of those different values, consciously or otherwise. As the individual pursues their values, they would express those values through interactions with other individuals. Which values are encouraged and which are discouraged would be the result of the social dynamics of the group, an 'economy of morals' if you will. As a group becomes a more structured unit like a tribe or state, it would begin to cast its dominant morals into rules and laws, imposing them onto those that may have alternative moralities. 

Now, going back to Lewis' argument: The law of nature might be some sort of universal moral feeling and measuring stick as he described it. But, it might also be an observation that there are a number of goods to be had, and which people use to guide their behavior and interaction with others. When conflicts arise, people act based on their opinion of which is the higher good. Personally, I prefer the latter definition. 

 The latter definition turns out to be an established theory called Value Pluralism by philosopher Isaiah Berlin. You can read some of his stuff here if you want.